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MAKING THE DOLLS

Imagine you hold a large, unwieldy sheet of paper. The paper is too large.
You find it hard to carry around, it is cumbersome. You decide to reduce its
volume. You fold it once and you fold it again. You are still weighed down. You
make some judicious cuts. You cut some from this edge and from that, but you
leave a center - a portion you think will be sufficient for your needs. Satisfied,
you try to place the folded, manicured paper into your portfolio. But as you put it
in, a breeze stirs and voila! You find a long string of connected shapes - a small
army of paper dolls. From one you have made many.
Surely the inventor of paper dolls must have been happy with the trick of
magically making many from one. Yet members of Congress have been repeatedly surprised when efforts at reducing federal court review of immigration decisions produce a perverse multiplication. Angered, frustrated, eager, Congress
once again picks up the shears. It strips from this corner and that. After Congress cuts, the federal judiciary must now interpret the jurisdictional restriction.
Federal court jurisdiction is malleable and courts are loathe to find a complete bar
to judicial review, especially where it involves constitutional questions such as
individual liberty and fairness. Soon it becomes evident that the adjudicatory
pattern does not match the legislative intent; the cases fail to fit Congress's desired pattern. 1
Today, jurisdiction over immigration law is by no means well defined by
clear limits. Instead the paper cutters find an unwieldy, complex mess defined by
confusion and "loopholes." Limitations on jurisdiction have bred a multitude of
1.
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litigation. The number of federal court cases reviewing removal orders has increased 970% in the past ten years. 2 As of September 2005, the immigration
cases represented 18% of the appellate civil docket. 3
Congress and the courts are not alone in augmenting the number of immigration cases in the federal courts. Congress has also urged the agencies enforcing
the immigration laws to increase enforcement, to reduce backlogs and to make
removal more swift and certain. At the same time that Congress was shearing
away at the forms of judicial review, the Department of Justice and its Executive
Office for Immigration Review ("EOIR") together with the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS") were increasing the number, rate and speed of adjudication of removal cases. 4 It is not only that Congress made the wrong cuts, it is
also that the sheer volume of the caseload entering the administrative system has
increased.
At its essence, my metaphor points out the failure of Congress and the agencies to recognize that people are not paper dolls. For unlike passive paper dolls,
the non-citizens opposing their removal from the United States are actors
animated and motivated to survive. What is at stake is their right to remain in
the United States. Many non-citizens have spent the majority of their lives here
or have spouses and children residing here lawfully. The jurisdictional statutes
and agency procedures focus on the number of removals or on the speed of adjudication. The metaphor of paper dolls is chillingly accurate as a reflection of a
system failing to fully acknowledge the human lives involved.
For these men, women and children in removal proceedings, the incentives
to litigate beyond the agency have partially increased as a reaction to the narrowing and elimination of prior forms of relief. Prior to 1996, the immigration
statutes provided many people with a way to regularize their status, to become
2.

Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum, Noncitizens Access the Federal Courts: How Demand for Review Exceeds Statutory Restriction, Master Trends in the Law 12 (Jan. 28, 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New
York Law School Law Review). See infra note 32 for a discussion of this paper and the methodology
used.

3.

LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2005 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR, TABLE B-3, U.S. COURTS OF
APPEALS-SOURCES OF APPEALS AND ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED, BY CIRCUIT 114 (2005),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2005/appendices/b3.pdf.

4.

There are various agencies responsible for the enforcement of the immigration law and removal orders in
particular. The Bureau of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") is a subdivision of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"). It provides the trial attorneys who represent the government position in removal proceedings. The U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services ("CIS") provides services
such as the processing of applications for lawful status and, during removal proceedings, a case may be
referred to a division of CIS. CIS adjudicators may also refer cases to ICE for initiation of removal
proceedings. The U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") is charged with border patrol and customs
enforcement. See generally U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, http://uscis.gov/graphics/
index.htm (last visited July 2, 2006); Immigration and Customs Enforcement, http://www.ice.gov/
graphics/index.htm (last visited July 2, 2006); U.S. Customs and Border Protection, http://www.cbp.gov
(last visited July 2, 2006); Department of Homeland Security, http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic (last visited
July 2, 2006).

39

MAKING PAPER DOLLS

"legal" through the removal process. Now, statutory bars on relief are very strict
and other forms of relief have been entirely eliminated. Thus, the individual
fights harder either to defeat the government assertion that he or she is subject to
removal or in the hope that litigation or time will somehow prevent removal. 5
In this paper, I argue that many of the reforms taken by Congress or by the
agency, although designed to increase efficiency have, in essence, backfired. I explore some of the statutory and administrative sources that are contributing to the
increase in immigration-related federal court cases. I also discuss substantive
immigration law issues and litigation strategies that, in combination with the
statutory/regulatory architecture, are adding to the growth in the number of
cases. I look at the interrelationship of these factors. Only by examining these
interconnections can we seriously understand the nature of the "problem." In
fact, depending on our goal for the immigration adjudication system, we might
conclude that judicial review of removal orders, even at this significant rate, is
both manageable and essential for the development of our immigration law and
policy.
\Vhile this article suggests some ways to achieve greater efficiency, I am
mindful of the "efficiency conundrum" as identified by Margaret Taylor. 6 By
accepting efficiency as a primary goal, I do not mean to imply that it is the only
goal of the adjudication system. The ideal system would also guarantee fair and
individualized procedures and that people are not illegally ordered removed.
The real challenge in achieving the goal of an efficient but fair adjudication
system for immigration cases is to recognize that unlike a method of making
paper dolls, the dynamism inherent in any legal system will always be present.
Even the closest observation of the existing conditions and interactions, and the
keenest insights from the pitfalls of the past, will not guarantee the creation of a
system free from problems. The parties within this world - Congress, the
courts, the agencies and the individuals facing removal - will adapt and react.
After discussing some of the problems and the dynamics of the players, this paper
will suggest reforms aimed at achieving more clarity, efficiency and fairness.

5.

See infra text accompanying notes 54-58.

6.

Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation far Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Refbrm, 29 CoNN. L. REV. 1647 (1997). Taylor notes that advocates for immigrants have appealed to the governmental desire for a more efficient immigration enforcement system by arguing that
providing legal representation to detained aliens will "speed up removal proceedings." Id. at 1709.
However, she cautions that while this may seem like a logical argument, providing legal representation to
detained aliens may not save the government time or money. Further, she notes the danger inherent in
this characterization of the role of attorneys in immigration proceedings - as zealous advocates, attorneys
for detained aliens should prioritize opposing governmental efforts to remove their clients, not speeding up
the removal process. Id.
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CONGRESS AND COURT-STRIPPING: CUTTING IS NOT A CURE

For the past ten years, Congress has tried to reduce the quantity and quality
of judicial review of administrative removal orders.7 Congress has repeatedly
tried to both narrow the appeals process and to bar categories of claims and
claimants from federal court review of these administrative orders. 8 Congress
intended the statute to name specific situations where judicial review of the
agency decision was preserved in a petition for review to the Court of Appeals
and to expressly bar petitions for review challenging specific legal claims or made
by specific categories of people. 9 The litigation response was to argue about
whether a person was within the barred group or making a disfavored claim.
For example, the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA") section 242(b) expressly barred an alien convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in the immigration statute from pursuing a petition for review. Thus, courts had to make a
legal determination of whether or not the agency correctly found the underlying
conviction was within the scope of the "aggravated felonies." 10 At times the
7.

Removal is a technical term that refers to both deportation and exclusion after a finding of inadmissibility.
Prior to 1996, the immigration statutes formally had two types of proceedings: one called a deportation
hearing and the other called an exclusion hearing. Today there is a single type of hearing although the
burdens of proof and forms of relief continue to vary depending on whether the government is charging a
non-citizen as an alien removable after admission (removal) or removable upon seeking admission (inadmissibility). See generally INA § 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000).

8.

The Illegal Immigrant Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110
Stat. 3009 [hereinafter IIRIRA] and the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 [hereinafter AEDPA] are the major examples.

9.

See Lenni B. Benson, Back to the Future: Congress Attacks the Right to judicial Review of Immigration Proceedings, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1411 (1997) (describing the statutory categories and the context
of the jurisdictional bars). The other group, disfavored claims, is most dramatically expressed in those
individuals seeking judicial review of a discretionary decision made by the immigration judge. Almost
every form of relief in removal proceedings is delegated to the agency's discretion. Daniel Kanstroom has
written extensively about the intersection of discretion and immigration law. In this symposium, he
revisits the importance of judicial review over these types of decisions. See Daniel Kanstroom, Surrounding the Hole in the Doughnut: Discretion and Deference in US. Immigration Law, 71 TuL.
L. REV. 703 (1997); Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion,
and the "Rule" of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. 161 (2006).

10. The definition of "aggravated felony" is long, complex and uses vague categories such as "a crime of
violence." See generally INA§§ 101(a)(43)(A)-(U), 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101(a)(43)(A)-(U) (2000). Crime of
violence is found in INA§ 101(a)(43)(F) 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F). Accordingly, the courts had to parse
the definition of crimes of violence. Splits in the circuits emerged including such as the Ninth and Second
Circuit Courts of Appeals' rejection that a conviction for driving under the influence would constitute a
crime of violence under INA§ 101(a)(43)(F). See Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1, 6 (2004). The government statistics do not report this specific crime as a separate ground of removal from those removed for
criminal grounds. The 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics indicate that there were 186,151
aliens formally removed in 2003. See OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., 2003 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 158 (2004) [hereinafter YEARBOOK], available at
http://uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/2003/2003ENF.pdf. The yearbooks also indicate that
in 2003 39,600 aliens were removed for criminal offenses and in 2004 the number increased to 42,510.
Compare id. at 160, and OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS, DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 189 (2003), available at http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/
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agency and courts seemed to be having a ping pong match bouncing back and
forth complex definitions of which crimes were indeed within this disfavored
class.
Courts also had to spend time exercising jurisdiction in order to determine
whether they had jurisdiction. For those litigants who conceded the statute
barred petitions for review in the courts of appeals, the vehicle to federal court
became the statutory writ of habeas corpus found in 28 U.S.C. § 2241. While the
immigration statutes did not expressly authorize judicial review under this statute, they also did not expressly limit habeas review. Thus, the Supreme Court
affirmed that habeas review remained for those shut out of the petition for
review. 11
The perverse result was to push more cases into both the courts of appeals, in
the form of standard petitions for judicial review of administrative orders, 12 and
into the district courts, in the form of habeas petitions 13 challenging removal
orders. In turn, the courts of appeals also heard appeals from the habeas cases in

shared/statistics/yearbook/2002/ENF2002.pdf, with OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION STATis·ncs, DEP'T OF
HOMELAND SEC., 2004 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STA"I1STICS 16 (2006), available at http://
www.uscis.gov/graphics/shared/statistics/yearbook/Yearbook2004.pdf. In contrast, the Eighth and Eleventh Circuit Courts of Appeals agreed with the Board of Immigration Appeals that a conviction for
driving under the influence could indeed be an aggravated felony regardless of the sanction imposed.
Ultimately, using ordinary rules of statutory interpretation, the Supreme Court rejected the agency's interpretation of the statute and held that driving under the influence was not a crime of violence. See
Leocal v. Ashcroft, 543 U.S. 1 (2004). In Leocal, the petitioner had initially been convicted on a DUI
charge and ordered removed under BIA and Eleventh Circuit precedent that had found the BIA inclusion
of DUI convictions as aggravated felonies to be reasonable. See id. at 4-5. Prior to Leocal's filing of a
petition for review, the BIA changed its mind, finding that DUI convictions would not qualify as an
aggravated felony and render an alien deportable. Id. at 6 n.2. The BIA, however, declared that it
would only apply the change in interpretation in circuits that had not already determined the issue. See
Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336, 346-47 (2002). The Eleventh Circuit accordingly rejected the
petition for review, recognizing that it had already supported the BIA's prior determination that Dills
were aggravated felonies in Lev. Att'y General, 196 F.3d 1352 (11th Cir. 1999). See Leocal, 543 U.S.
at 6 n.2. In fact, this decision may ultimately increase litigation as the Supreme Court did not discuss the
standard rules of deference to agency interpretation. Chief Justice Rehnquist elected to use plain meaning
interpretation of the statutory language rather than granting deference to the agency's decision. This
approach was, in part, necessitated by the BIA's reversal of its own interpretation. The Supreme Court
heard oral argument in October 2006, on the issue of whether state drug convictions qualify as an "aggravated felony" for purposes of immigration laws. See Lopez v. Gonzales, No. 05-547; Toledo-Bores v.
U.S., No. 05-7664 (cases consolidated), available at http://www.ilw.com/immigdaily/news/2006,0810scourt.pd£
11.

See INS. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2003) (holding that habeas review of removal orders remained
available because Congress had not included express language suspending it).

12. INA§ 242(b)(4)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2000). This is the federal statutory grant of habeas corpus jurisdiction which was
passed by the first Congress of the United States in 1789.
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the district courts. 14 The net effect was a multiplication of levels and forms of
judicial review. 1 s
Most recently, Congress passed the REAL ID Act and took the dramatic step
of explicitly barring habeas corpus review of removal orders. 16 Time will tell
how this will play out in the courts. In the short term it has meant a transfer of
all habeas petitions from the district court to the appeals courts, even in cases
where the district court had heard all arguments and was ready to make a
decision. 17
Ill.

EXECUTIVE ENFORCEMENT: MORE PAPER

At the same time that Congress was formally restricting judicial review via
statutory amendments, the Departments of Justice and Homeland Security were
increasing enforcement of the deportation/removal statutes and streamlining the
administrative review process. 18 The changes were, and remain, dramatic. In
2002, the EOIR looked for ways to speed cases through the administrative appel14. 28 U.S.C. § 2253 (2000). This statute allows habeas cases to be appealed to the circuit courts of appeals
and by certiorari to the Supreme Court. This differs from 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which creates original jurisdiction of habeas cases in the federal courts.
l 5. An example of the ping pong game that occurs when the non-citizen is not given a forum to review the
decisions of the BIA is illustrated by Flores-Garza v. INS, 328 F.3d 797 (5th Cir. 2003). Flores-Garza
was lawfully in the United States and was ordered removed because of two convictions. He had initially
pled guilty to a burglary charge and received a suspended five-year sentence. Twenty years later, FloresGarza pled guilty to a second charge of marijuana possession. The IJ determined that he was removable
because ofboth convictions. Flores-Garza requested relief under INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229(b), which
allows certain permanent residents to request cancellation of removal and adjustment of status but the IJ
denied the request based on a determination that the crimes were aggravated felonies. The BIA affirmed
the IJ's decision and dismissed Flores-Garza's appeal. He filed a petition for review of the BIA's final
order of removal, arguing that the charging document did not include an aggravated felony. While the
government's motion to dismiss was pending, Flores-Garza filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
"Flores's habeas petition raised statutory and constitutional claims and reiterated the arguments raised in
his petition for review." 328 F.3d at 800. The district court dismissed the habeas petition for lack of
jurisdiction. Id. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals later dismissed his petition for review of the BIA
order of removal. Flores-Garza filed a notice of appeal for the dismissal of the habeas petition and a
motion to reinstate his petition for direct review of the BIA order. The Fifth Circuit granted FloresGarza's motion to reinstate the petition for review, and the issues were briefed. The Fifth Circuit consolidated the petition for review with his appeal of the dismissal of the habeas petition, but then found that
they lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA decision. However, they determined that the district court did
have jurisdiction to decide the habeas petition. Thus the Fifth Circuit ultimately vacated the district
court's dismissal and remanded the habeas case to the district court. Id. at 799. If the case is still pending
there, the REAL ID Act provides for the re-transfer of the case back to the Court of Appeals.
16.

See infra notes 87-90 and accompanying text.

17.

See infra note 87 (discussing the REAL ID Act).

l 8. See supra note 4 for a description of the agencies. While the statutory reorganization in 2002 was
intended to allow coordination of immigration and national security, the reorganization did not give
DHS total control because it left the immigration administrative courts within the Department of Justice.
This is an odd structure for efficiency. One agency can set an agenda without coordination with the other
agency and the values of one may not be shared by another. Moreover, the multiple agencies increase the
complexity of coordination of actions within the cases and communication among the key participants.
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late process, where the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") hears the administrative appeals from individual removal orders. 19 These changes sought to
reduce the backlog but at the same time the Attorney General reduced the number
of BIA members from twenty-three to eleven. 20 Among other changes, the reforms authorized the review of the administrative hearing below by a single
member of the BIA rather than the existing practice of review by a panel of three
members. 21 Further, that member could summarily affirm the Immigration
Judge's ("IJ") decision without an opinion. 22 Most importantly, the BIA altered
the standard of administrative review. Rather than reviewing the decision de
nova as it has always done previously, the new regulations limit de nova review to issues of law or the exercise of discretion and declare that findings of fact
will be reviewed only on a clearly erroneous standard. 23
19. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2006). Although these regulations became final in 2002, the BIA had been working to
reduce its backlog through a variety techniques including a pilot project that utilized a process known as
"Affirmance Without Opinion." This change was promulgated in Streamlining, 64 Fed. Reg. 56, 135
(Oct. 18, 1999). See generally John R.B. Palmer, et al., Why Are So Many People Challenging Board

ef Immigration Appeals Decisions in Federal Court? An Empirical Analysis ef the Recent Surge in
Petitions far Review, 20 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 1 (2005); Emily D. Stein, The Due Process Implications of
the Board of Alien Appeals' Streamlining (May 2004) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York
Law School Law Review). See Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878
(Aug. 26, 2002) (adopting final regulations supporting streamlining and explaining the pressures on the
BIA to reduce its backlog and handle its incoming cases).
For a detailed analysis of the BIA reforms, see DoRSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, STUDY CONDUCTED FoR
THE AMERICAN BAR AssocJATION CoMM1ss10N ON IMMIGRATION PoucY, PRACTICE AND PRo BoNo
RE: BOARD OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS: PROCEDURAL REFORMS TO IMPROVE CASE MANAGEMENT
(2003), availableat http://www.dorsey.com/files/upload/DorseyStudyABA_8mgPDF.pd£

20. Procedural Reforms to Improve Case Management, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,878, 54,879 (Aug. 26, 2002) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1). While it may seem perverse to reduce appellate administrative judges when
the agency faced a huge backlog, the Attorney General removed from the BIA those members who were
most likely to provide dissents or to write concurring opinions that suggested alternative legal analysis.
The Dorsey Study cited above contains a productivity study of the BIA. Today, the BIA's support staff has
grown quite large and the initial screening mechanism for determining which cases fit streamlining criteria are handled by staff attorneys. There are currently 115 staff attorneys and ten paralegals who support
BIA members. E-mail from Elaine Komis, EOIR Legislative and Public Affairs, to Roderick Potts,
Research Assistant, New York Law School (July 27, 2005, 03:22 EST) (on file with the New York Law
School Law Review).
21 .

8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(f)(l) (2006).

22.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(a)(7) (2006).

23.

8 C.F.R. § 1003.l(d)(3) (2006). The clearly erroneous standard was apparently adopted from Rule 52 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and is the standard an appellate court uses to review the findings of
fact made in a bench trial. Of course, in a civil court proceeding, the findings are also shaped by the
Federal Rules of Evidence. These rules do not formally or habitually apply in immigration proceedings, a
species of administrative hearings. For a thoughtful critique of this standard and a query about why no
cases had resulted in reversal one year after the adoption of this higher standard, see Lory Diana Rosenberg, Separate Opinion: Independence and Deference Under the Clearly Erroneous Standard ef
Review, 8 BENDER'S IMMIGR. Bm.L. 1805 (2003).
This standard of review of the factual findings is particularly disturbing because the judicial review
provision is also extremely deferential. The INA provides that a court may not reverse the agency finding
of facts unless no reasonable adjudicator could have come to that conclusion. See INA § 242(b)(4)(B), 8
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These streamlining changes were extremely successful in lowering the BIA' s
backlog of cases. 24 Even as more and more appeals were filed for the consecutive
years, the BIA still managed to lessen its backlog considerably (by the thousands
for each year that cases were filed). Generally, of the cases that were pending in
the BIA in September of 2004, over 84% had been adjudicated by the following
year. 25 Figure 1 shows the dramatic decrease over time in the backlog.

U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2000). If the BIA is not reviewing the factual findings or is summarily affirming
the IJ opinion, the decision of the single administrative officer becomes the entire support for the factual
basis of removal. IJ decisions are frequently dictated at the end of the administrative proceeding and may
or may not include citation to the documents or exhibits in the case.
I was only able to find a single reported BIA case reversing the IJ using this standard of "clearly erroneous." See Matter of Budi Santoso, 31 Immig. Rptr. Bl-15 (BIA 2005). The IJ's decision on the credibility of the non-citizen's statements was based entirely on the fact he had not filed his asylum application in
a timely manner. The case appears to be fairly extreme, for the BIA commented about the complete
absence of the usual criteria for determining credibility. "Notably, the Immigration Judge did not cite to
any inconsistencies or discrepancies between the respondent's testimony and his application or accompanying statement. He made no mention of the respondent's demeanor, and he did not express any concerns
over the reliability or authenticity of the respondent's documentary evidence. Instead, the immigration
judge concluded that 'the respondent did not experience these incidents to which he testified,' because 'a
reasonable person' who had endured such suffering 'would have made an application for asylum' sooner
(I.J. at 6)." Id.
After I presented this paper, Walter H. Ruehle, an attorney in Buffalo, New York, sent me a redacted
unpublished BIA decision where the BIA also found clear error. In this unpublished case dated March 11,
2005, the BIA found that the IJ's findings that the petitioner lacked credibility were not based on material
findings nor supported by the record.
Unfortunately, this pattern reminds me of an earlier time when Congress chose to put reliance on a single
examiner. See, e.g., Nishimura Eiku v. United States, 142 U.S. 651 (1892) (the finding of the border
officer is conclusive and sufficient to determine who may be admitted); see also Lucy SALYER, LAWS
HARSH AS TIGERS: CHINESE IMMIGRANTS AND THE SHAPING OF MODERN IMMIGRATION LAw(1995).
In this historical assessment of the administration of the immigration laws at the turn of the twentieth
century, Salyer points out how often the officer's decision could be based on bias or erroneous stereotyping
and how insulation from judicial review shaped the adjudication culture. Id. at 136-56.
2 4. The statistical analysis of the BIA workload and the relationship to the increase in the federal courts
caseload is largely based on the detailed and excellent analysis prepared by Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum. See
Kroll-Rosenbaum, supra note 2.
25.

OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECH., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, FY 2005
STATISTICAL YEAR BooK, Ul (2006), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/fy05syb.pdf. On
September 30, 2004, there were 89 cases pending that had been filed before 2001. A year later, by
September 30, 2005, there were only 36. For cases filed in 2001, the number went from 72 to 15; for
2002, 379 to 62; for 2003, 5,877 to 169; for 2004, 28,847 to 5,189. Id.
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Figure 1: BIA Pending Appeal Cases 26

Year Filed
Pre-FY 2001
FY 2001
FY 2002
FY 2003
FY 2004
FY 2005

Pending 9/30/04
89
72
379
5,877
28,847

Pending 9/30/05

36
15

62
169
5, 189
24,023

Still, the streamlining itself led to two types of litigation. First, there were
and continue to be challenges to the process itsel£ By and large, these cases have
resulted in the courts of appeals finding that the single BIA member review and
altered standards by themselves did not deny a non-citizen due process of law. 27
The second form of litigation challenges the accuracy and merits of the BIA decision itsel£ The non-citizen who disagreed with the IJ's assessments and receives
a summary affirmance via the streamlining regulations had no opportunity to
have that decision tested except via judicial review in federal court. 28 Moreover,
the complexity of the immigration law itself increased in the incentives to seek
further review. A study produced by Dorsey & Whitney, LLP29 found that the
large number of new immigration cases and novel legal issues may have also
contributed to judicial review of BIA decisions. 30
26. Id.
27.

See, e.g., Ngure v. Ashcroft, 367 F.3d 975 (8th Cir. 2004); Falcon Carriche v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 1009
(9th Cir. 2003); Georgis v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 962 (7th Cir. 2003); Mendoza v. U.S. Att'y Gen., 327
F.3d 1283 (11th Cir. 2003); Soadjede v. Ashcroft, 324 F.3d 830 (5th Cir. 2003) (per curiam); Albathani
v. I.N.S., 318 F.3d 365 (lst Cir. 2003); see also Stein, supra note 19. Some circuit courts have raised
questions as to the propriety of the use of the streamlining provisions in certain circumstances. See, e.g.,
Smriko v. Ashcroft, 387 F.3d 279 (3d Cir. 2004); Zhu v. Ashcroft, 382 F.3d 521 (5th Cir. 2004); Haoud
v. Ashcroft, 350 F.3d 201 (1st Cir. 2003).

28. In some cases it is possible that the non-citizen would file a motion to reconsider or reopen with the BIA
pointing out the errors of the streamlining decisions. Strategically, an attorney may hesitate to bring a
motion to reconsider rather than directly seeking judicial review because the regulations limit the noncitizen to a single motion except in limited circumstances. Attorneys might choose to let the federal court of
appeals or the district court, in a habeas proceeding, remand the case and thus win the reopening rather
than "waste" the motion to reconsider or reopen. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c) (2006) (only a single motion to
reopen authorized unless joined by counsel for the government).
29.

See DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, supra note 19.

30. Id. at 13. The study points to nine statutes promulgated by Congress, including the Patriot Act, that have
contributed to the complexity of issues that are considered at the administrative level and upon review by
the courts of appeals. Id. at 14. The courts of appeals appear to be growing increasingly frustrated by the
BIA's summary affirmances. In Lanza v. Ashcrefi, 389 F.3d 917 (9th Cir. 2004), the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals recognized that the BIA had summarily affirmed a decision of an IJ that may have
touched on issues that fell outside of the Court of Appeals' jurisdiction. However, the court could not know
what basis the BIA relied on for its affirmance without an opinion to review. The court had no choice but
to remand the case to the BIA for a clarification of the grounds for its summary affirmance, just so they
could later determine a threshold jurisdictional question. In the nine months following Lanza, the Ninth
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The details of the administrative streamlining are beyond the scope of this
article; however, the statutory restrictions and litigation about the nature of jurisdiction itself combined with increased enforcement and administrative appellate streamlining to create an explosion in the workload of the federal courts. 31
How large an explosion? As noted above, the total number of federal court cases
reviewing orders of the BIA has increased 970% in the past ten years. 32 This
enormous increase means that immigration cases represent more than 18% of the
federal appellate court civil docket. 33 Further, the BIA cases make up a remarkable 88.2% of all administrative appeals heard in the courts of appeals. 34
Focusing on the period between 2000 and 2004, BIA appeals have soared
almost 357% since 2000 and have more than doubled in every circuit since
Circuit remanded twenty-four decisions to the BIA for the same clarification. Other circuit courts have
begun to find that the BIA is glossing over complex jurisdictional issues. See, e.g., Zhu v. Ashcroft, 382
F.3d 521, 527 (5th Cir. 2004) (describing how the BIA summary affirmance created a "jurisdictional
conundrum"); Gjyzi v. Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 710, 716 (6th Cir. 2004) ("[T]he failure of the BIA to explain
its decision in this case unnecessarily frustrates our review."); Lin v. Dep't of Justice, 132 F. App'x 920,
923 (2d Cir. 2005) (remanding the case seven years after the IJ decision because it was unclear on what
grounds BIA affirmed).
31 . For an assessment of the streamlining regulations see Evelyn H. Cruz, Double the Injustice, Twice the
Harm: The Impact of the Board ef Immigration Appeals' Summary Affirmance Procedures, 16
STAN. L. & PoL'Y REV 481 (2005). I also benefitted from a paper by a NYLS honors student. See also
Stein, supra note 19.
32. Kroll-Rosenbaum, supra note 4, at 12 (citing LEONIDAS RALPH MECHAM, 2004 ANNUAL REPORT OF
THE DIRECTOR, TABLE B-3, U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS-SOURCES OF APPEALS AND ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS COMMENCED, BY CIRCUIT, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2004/appendices/b3
.pdf). She determined that for every BIA appeal filed in 1993, 970 were filed in 2004. Id. The figure
reflects the percentage increase in the number of BIA appeals from 1993 to 2004, but does not take into
account the increase in the total docket of the courts of appeals over that time frame. The dramatic
increase in BIA appeals since 1993 constitutes approximately two-thirds of the total increase in the workload for the courts of appeals. The dramatic increase has been reported in other terms. For example, one
account reported a 781 % increase in the monthly appeals from the BIA to the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals during the twelve months between February 2002 and February 2003. See Immigration Appeals Surge in Courts, THE THIRD BRANCH (Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts Office of Public Affairs,
Washington, D.C.), Sept. 2003, available at http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/sep03ttb/immigration/
index.html. See also CoMM. ON FED. COURTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., THE SURGE
OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SECOND CIRCUIT CouRT OF APPEALS (2004),
available at http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/AppealSurgeReport.pdf.
33. MECHAM, supra note 3, at 114. There has also been a large increase in the federal courts' criminal docket
related to the prosecution of immigration-related offenses. From 2003 to 2004, immigration appeals
ranked second in overall criminal appeals filings, behind appeals involving drugs. OFFICE OF JUDGES
PROGRAMS, STATISTICS DIVISION, AoMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL
CASELOAD STATISTICS 9 (2004), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/caseload2004/front/judbus04.pdf.
"Criminal appeals rose 4 percent in 2004 to 12,056, mainly because of increases in filings related to
firearms and immigration violations." Id. at 8. This paper does not address those criminal prosecutions
that were regular criminal cases and not judicial review of administrative proceedings.
34. MECHAM, supra note 3, at 88. Of the 12,255 administrative appeals made in 2004, 10,812 of them were
from the BIA. Id. I note the irony that most administrative law casebooks pay little, if any, attention to
immigration cases.
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2002. 35 "The surge in BIA appeals has particularly stretched the resources of the
Ninth and Second Circuits, which received 47 percent and 25 percent, respectively, of all BIA petitions filed in 2004."36 In those circuits, immigration cases
now make up more than thirty percent of all cases. 37 The circuits are hearing
almost as many administrative appeals as criminal appeals. A significant portion of those appeals have come from asylum-seekers challenging final orders of
removal and denial of asylum relie£ 38 Moreover, as evidenced by the chart below, the rate of increase has not been incremental. As several authors have characterized it, there has been a "surge" in immigration cases. 39
Figure 2: Appeals Cases Filed in Federal Circuit Courts, by type of Appeal

Year
filed

Prisoner
Petitions

Criminal
Appeals

Administrative
Agency Appeals

2001
2002
2003
2004
2005

18,343
18,272
l 7 ,691
16,561
l 7,034

11,281
11,569
11,968
12,506
16,060

3,300
5,789
9,988
12,255
13,713

IV.

Total
Circuit Court

57,464
57,555
60,847
62, 762
68,473

THE PAPER DOLLS ANIMATED

The increase in the number of cases in the federal courts is not explained by
the increase in the workload of the agency alone. The rate of people seeking
review of the BIA decisions has also dramatically increased. 40 What is motivat35. OFFICE OF JuoGES PROGRAMS, STATISTICS DIVISION, AoMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, supra
note 33, at 8. The Administrative Office further concluded that the surge in BIA filings since 2000 can be
mostly attributed to changes made by the 2002 streamlining guidelines for processing BIA cases. Id.

36. Id; see also Palmer, et al., supra note 19.
37. See Adam Liptak, Courts Criticize judges' Handling
A6.

efAsylum

Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 26, 2005, at

38. See Palmer, et al., supra note 19, at 71-72. The authors estimate that of BIA appeals of IJ decisions
within the Second Circuit, Chinese asylum-seekers make up between thirty-five and fifty-five percent of
the population of the petitions for review. Id. at 72. The workload of decisions within the Ninth Circuit
is distributed more widely between asylum and non-asylum claims. Id. The authors suggest that the
relatively high rate of appeal in these two circuits may be due to the relatively high percentage of asylumseekers in those two geographic regions. Id.

39. Id. at 3 & n.1; see also COMM. ON FED. COURTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CnY OF N.Y., supra note
32.
40. John R.B. Palmer, The Nature and Causes ef the Immigration Surge in the Federal Courts ef
Appeals: A Preliminary Analysis, 51 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REv. 13 (2006); see also Palmer et al., supra note
19. These authors discovered a 34% total appeal rate for all circuits, lead by the high number and rate of
appeals of BIA cases which ultimately are heard by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals (42% of the BIA
cases arising in the Second Circuit are appealed) and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (45% of the BIA
cases arising in the Ninth Circuit are appealed). Id. at 53-54. From May to August 2004, the BIA
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ing these litigants? In this section I explore some of the strategic reasons litigants
are seeking review in the federal court. I also discuss some of the characteristics
of the repeat players in the system.
In the initial administrative removal hearing the responding non-citizen
may contest the allegations of the government charging document, the Notice to
Appear, or may concede his or her removability. 41 While there are no detailed
published statistical studies, the government reports that in a significant percentage of cases the non-citizen does not appear. 42 The IJ proceeds with an in absentia order of removal and the administrative case is final. 43 Recently, the EOIR
reported a large increase in the number of in absentia orders, from 47,408 in
2004 to 100,994 in 2005. 44 In another large percentage of the cases, the noncitizen facing removal concedes the allegations and moves directly to request a
statutory form of relief from removal. 45 In 1996 Congress greatly restricted the
forms of relief. For example, in the past an individual might have been able to
admit that he or she was removable, ask for voluntary departure and then apply
for an immigrant visa at the U.S. consulate abroad based on a sponsoring employer or family member. Since 1996 departure from the United States after a
issued 11,296 final orders and of these, 6514 petitions for review were filed in those two circuits alone.
Id. at 54.
4 l.

See generally INA§ 240, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2000) (describing removal proceedings).

42. In 2003, a small sample indicated that 66% of non-citizens failed to appear for their hearings and were
ordered removed in absentia. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL EVALUATION AND INSPECTIONS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE'S REMOVAL OF
ALIENS IssUED FINAL ORDERS, REPORT NUMBER I-2003-004 13 (2003), available at http://
www.usdoj.gov/oig/reports/INS/e0304/final.pdf ('We examined the in absentia rate within our sample
of 308 nondetained cases and found that 204 (66%) of the aliens failed to appear for their removal proceedings and were ordered removed in absentia. We examined the correlation between removals and
court attendance and found that the aliens' failure to appear before the Immigration Judge at removal
proceedings is a significant and strong negative indicator for the likelihood of removal by the INS. Of the
204 aliens ordered removed in absentia [sic], only 14 had been removed, a removal rate of 7 percent. In
contrast, 26 of the 103 aliens who attended the hearing where they received their removal order had been
removed, a rate of 25 percent.").
43. Immigration Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-649, § 545(a), 104 Stat. 4978, 5063; 8 C.F.R. § 1003.26(b)
(2006). If the person later comes to the attention of the government, he or she can be removed without
further administrative action. Some people who are subject to in absentia orders later seek to reopen their
case administratively or challenge the validity of the in absentia order in federal court. See, e.g., Matter
of Ester Koka Kalonji, 27 Immig. Rptr. Bl-80 (April 14, 2003) (finding exceptional circumstances and
ordering the case reopened even though she had notice of original hearing); Sabir v. Gonzales, 421 F.3d
456 (7th Cir. 2005) (reversing BIA finding about the actual receipt of notice); see also Lopez v. Ashcroft,
267 F. Supp. 2d 150 (D. Mass. 2003) (affirming a denial of a motion to reopen).
44.

OFFICE OF PLANNING, ANALYSIS, & TECH., EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, supra note
26, at H2. For analysis purposes, the EOIR combines in absentia orders with administrative closures
where the IJ does not order the alien removed, under the category of "Failures to Appear." Between 2004
and 2005, there was a 103% increase in Failure to Appear completions. However, 52% of the completions
occurred in just two Immigration Courts, in San Antonio and Harlingen, Texas. Id. at Hl.

4 5. Immigration Judges are not empowered to grant relief in a general equitable sense but can only consider
those forms of relief from removal authorized by statute.
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period of unlawful presence triggers a three- or ten-year bar on returning to the
United States. 46 Many people subject to these bars are not eligible for any waivers. Even though qualified to immigrate under the preference categories, statutory bars on adjustment of status within the U.S. and bars on return if they
depart create an incentive to delay the departure. 47 Congress has also limited or
eliminated waivers for those convicted of crimes, even minor crimes, and created
statutory bars to asylum. 48 The form of relief previously called "suspension of
deportation"49 that allowed adjustment after seven years of physical presence,
proof of good moral character, and proof of hardship to the individual facing
removal was transformed into "cancellation of removal." Congress expanded the
residence period to ten years and now requires that the individual prove his or
her deportation will create exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to a U.S.
citizen or permanent resident spouse, parent or child. 50
Today an attorney advising a client about his or her defenses to removal is
more likely to suggest contesting the allegations of removability, especially where
the government allegations characterize a criminal conviction as an "aggravated
felony." 51 The consequences of allowing the allegation of aggravated felony to
stand include not just preclusion from most forms of relief but also a lifetime bar
to naturalization and potentially to ever regaining lawful residence in the
United States. 52 The government lawyers and Congress may object that the in46.

See INA§ 212(a)(9), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9) (2000); Sonia Chen, The Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act ef 1996: Another Congressional Hurdle far the Courts, 8 IND. ].
GLOBAL LEG. STUD. 169, 184-85 (2000) (describing the bars under INA § 212(a)(9)); Emma 0. Guzman, The Dynamics of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act ef 1996:
The Splitting-Up efAmerican Families, 2 SCHOLAR 95 (2000) (describing the terrible choices a noncitizen has to make when they are undocumented and unable to leave the country for fear of the ten-year
bars).

47.

See INA§§ 212(a)(9), 245. See generally, Stephen Yale-Loehr & Brian Palmer, Un/a~/ Presence
Update, 6 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BuLL. 507 (2001) (describing the different bars applicable when a person
is unlawfully present within the United States).

48.

See generally DAN KEsSELBRENNER, IMMIGRATION LAW AND CRIMES (2002). This treatise explores
the many varied immigration consequences of criminal convictions.

49. INA§ 244(a)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1254(a)(l) (repealed 1996).
50.

See INA§ 240A, 8 U.S.C. § 1229b (2000); Bruce A. Hake, Hardship Standards, 7 BENDER'S IMMIGR.
BULL. 59 (2002).

51.

See INA§ 101(a)(43). Those unfamiliar with this long statutory definition may not be aware that the
label, aggravated felony, has been broadened to include crimes that are only misdemeanors under the
relevant state, foreign or federal statute. Recently the BIA found that "unauthorized use of a vehicle"
qualified as an aggravated felony because the BIA accepted the government's assertion that it was a "crime
of violence." See In re Brieva-Perez, 23 I&N Dec. 766 (BIA 2005). The decision is of questionable
validity given the Supreme Court's prior decision in Leocal v. Ashcrefi, discussed supra note 10; unfortunately, the BIA did not distinguish Leocal in its opinion. This is just one example of the broad scope of
criminal convictions that the government may classify as an aggravated felony under immigration law.
See also Lopez v. Gonzalez, No. 05-547; Toledo-Flores v. U.S., No. 05-7664 (cases consolidated), discussed supra note 10.

52.

See INA§ 101(0, 8 U.S.C. § llOl(f) (2000); INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(i), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(I).
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dividuals who challenge these classifications are merely obstructing removal or
litigating to buy time, but given what is at stake, it is understandable that attorneys and pro se litigants challenge the allegation. Indeed, they have been fairly
successful. In a significant number of cases, the agency has found that its characterization of a conviction has been based on an erroneous reading of the immigration statutes.53
Put another way, in the past if a client was facing removal due to a criminal conviction, many attorneys would not spend time or money contesting
whether the grounds for conviction were in fact the same as the grounds for
deportability. Instead, the attorney would recommend to the client that he or she
concede removability and instead seek relief from removal such as the discretionary section "212(c)" waiver that was previously available to long term permanent residents. 54 Because the waiver required the IJ to find that the person was
unlikely to commit another crime and had experienced some type of rehabilitation, attorneys and clients feared antagonizing the IJ by first litigating the technical statutory grounds of removal. 55
Another factor increasing the incentive to litigate is the statutory preclusion
of seeking judicial review of a discretionary decision. 56 While judicial review of
immigration discretionary decisions was always deferential - the court had to
find that the agency acted in an arbitrary or capricious manner to reverse a
53.

See, e.g., Gill v. INS, 420 F.3d 82, 91 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that BIA erroneously found that attempted
reckless assault was an aggravated felony); Lara-Cazares v. Gonzales, 408 F.3d 1217, 1218 (9th Cir.
2005) (holding that BIA erroneously found that gross vehicular manslaughter while intoxicated was an
aggravated felony); Argaw v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 521, 523 (4th Cir. 2005) (legal determination that khat,
a traditional herbal stimulant, is a controlled substance was incorrect, "[b ]ecause khat is not listed as a
controlled substance and it has not been established when khat might contain a controlled substance");
Knapik v. Ashcroft, 384 F.3d 84, 93 (3d Cir. 2004) (reversing the BIA's finding that "attempted reckless
endangerment in the first degree" was a crime involving moral turpitude); Garcia-Lopez v. Ashcroft, 334
F.3d 840, 846 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that BIA erroneously rejected the state court's determination that
the crime of stealing a purse was a misdemeanor and petty offense); Francis v. Reno, 269 F.3d 162,
174-75 (3d Cir. 2001) (explaining that the Pennsylvania statute defined homicide by vehicle as a misdemeanor and the BIA erroneously rejected that definition and charged removability based on an aggravated felony of a "crime of violence"); Coronado-Durazo v. INS, 123 F.3d 1322, 1325 (9th Cir. 1997)
(holding the BIA erroneously found that solicitation to possess cocaine was an aggravated felony).

54. The section 212(c) waiver was the subject of litigation in INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2003). Basically
the waiver allowed long-term residents of the U.S. to seek a discretionary waiver of deportation notwithstanding criminal conduct or other characteristics that might render them subject to removal. Congress
repealed the waiver in 1996. But in INS v. St. Cyr, the Supreme Court found the waiver was not
completely retroactive.
5 5. I base this understanding of the strategies in removal proceedings in part on my ten years of practice
experience. See also MANUEL vARGAS, REPRESENTING NoNCITIZEN CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS IN NEW
YORK STATE (3d ed. 2003).
56.

See, e.g., INA § 208, 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (2000) (grant of asylum is discretionary); INA § 240A, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1229b (grant of cancellation of removal is discretionary); INA § 245, 8 U.S.C. § 1255 (adjustment of
status is discretionary). Almost every form of relief from removal is, by statute, committed to the discretion of the Attorney General and therefore delegated to the discretion of the IJ or BIA.
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discretionary decision - in 1996 Congress blocked judicial review of all decisions
committed to the discretion of the agency. 57 Knowing there is no judicial review
of the discretionary decision, an attorney may now recharacterize litigation to
raise constitutional or statutory issues. Barring review of the act of discretion has
frequently only shifted the litigation strategy not eliminated litigation. Therefore, foreclosing judicial review of the discretionary decisions raised the stakes for
the agency's adjudication of other issues and increased the likelihood that the
predicate legal facts of either removability or of qualification for the discretionary
relief would be litigated. 58
For those people seeking asylum in the United States, the petition for review
is the last chance to have a claim to refugee status recognized. Since the creation
of the statutory right to seek asylum in 1980, Congress has preserved the right of
an applicant to seek judicial review of the agency rejection of a claim of asylum.
At times, Congress has restricted the time period to seek asylum or created statutory bars to eligibility for asylum relief; but in general, the law of asylum has
developed on a case-by-case basis before the BIA and after review in the federal
courts of appeals. In some circuits, a large percentage of the cases on appeal are
from people seeking asylum. 59 Preliminary studies suggest that the increase in
appeals is due to streamlined review before the administrative agency. 60 Several
of the attorneys I interviewed for this paper suggested that they were now seeking federal court review of denial in asylum cases because of the poor quality of
the reasoning in the administrative process and because the majority of the asylum claims were based on the IJ rejecting the credibility of the applicant. 61 While
judicial review of credibility determinations is extremely deferential in administrative law, many of these attorneys pointed to the number of appellate decisions
where the federal courts chastised the agency adjudication for poor reasoning,
irrational conclusions and failure to adequately consider evidence in the record. 62
The circuit courts have also openly criticized individual IJs for inappropriate

57.

See INA§ 242(a)(2)(B), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B).

58. See, e.g., Kalaw v. INS, 133 F.3d 1147 (9th Cir. 1997). For a discussion of the effects of administrative
foreclosure of discretionary judicial review of administrative determinations after the REAL ID Act, see
Daniel Kanstroom, The Better Part of Valor: The REAL ID Act, Discretion, and "Rule" of Immigration Law, 51 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REV. 161 (2006).

59. See Palmer, et al., supra note 19, at 71-72.
60.

See DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, supra note 19.

61 . Attorney Interviews conducted August, September, and October of 2005 (notes on file with author). See

irifra note 105. Based on my informal interviews of several private and government attorneys, a large
number of the petition for review cases are "settled" by the parties in the sense that the case is remanded to
the BIA. One of the main reasons for these settlements is the government counsel's opinion that the record
reflects errors that would weaken the government's support of the BIAIIJ decision.
62.

52

See Pamela A. MacLean, Circuit Court Review: judges Blast Immigration Rulings, NATL L.J. (Oct.
14, 2005), at Sl.
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comments on the testimony of asylum applicants. 63 In rare cases, the court has
awarded attorney's fees to the respondent's counsel. 64 The Attorney General, in
response to increasing media scrutiny, recently issued a memorandum expressing
great concern at the growing number of low quality decisions and lack of respect
shown by some of the IJs.65
Attorneys increasingly believe that petitions for review are worthwhile.
Even if the court does not reverse every case, the attorneys believe they are educating the court and the agency below that some behavior will not be tolerated.
One attorney told me that more than 50% of his cases were remanded. While
some of these cases were the result of formal opinions, more often, the remands
were as a result of stipulated settlements. 66 In his view, the petition for review
was often the first time that a government attorney who exercised real thought
and discretion reviewed the case. 67 This ability to get the attorney's review was
a prime motivator in seeking review.
Finally, the increased use of detention has raised the incentive to litigate
and created new litigation forms. Parties now litigate not only the predicate
allegations that render them subject to detention, but also the length of detention. 68 The use of detention in civil proceedings will always trigger constitutional inquiries into the liberty of the detained people. Thus, as long as the
63. See Wang v. Att'y Gen., 423 F.3d 260 (3d Cir. 2005) (criticizing the court for "unduly harsh character
judgments"). This case and others are discussed in Christine B. LaBrie, Third Circuit Describes "Disturbing Pattern of If Misconduct" In Asylum Cases, available at http://www.ilw.com/articles/
2005,1027-labrie.shtm (last visited Aug. 28, 2006).
64. See Johnson v. Gonzales, No. 03-1931 (3d Cir. 2005) (finding that the asylum petitioner was entitled to
attorneys' fees of $10,000 because the agency's decision was not supported by substantial evidence where it
failed to consider the petitioner's testimony and awarding attorneys' fees under the Equal Access to Justice
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412, which allows a private party to recover attorneys' fees if he or she is the prevailing
party).
65. Memorandum from U.S. Attorney General to Immigration Judges (Jan. 9, 2006), http://
www.humanrightsfirst.info/pdf/06202-asy-ag-memo-ijs.pdf (last visited June 28, 2006) [hereinafter
Memorandum]. The New York Times has published a number of front-page stories exposing some of the
most egregious of these decisions. See, e.g., Nina Bernstein, New York's Immigration Courts Lurch
Under a Growing Burden, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2006, at Al; Liptak, supra note 37. Other papers have
published similar stories. See Abdon M. Pallasch & Natasha Korecki, Judges Fight Speedy Deportations; Appeals Court Here Slams Immigration jurists' Decisions, CHI. SUN-TIMES, Nov. 14, 2004,
at 13.
66. The remands after mediation or settlement are also discussed in the report of the Committee on Federal
Courts Association of the Bar of the City of New York, supra note 32.
67.

See Attorney Interviews, supra note 61.

68.

See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003) (upholding detention of a lawful permanent resident pending
removal proceedings); see also Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005) (rejecting indefinite detention of
inadmissible aliens who were not able to return to their country and the government had ceased efforts to
return them); Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001) (requiring periodic review of the detention of
those subject to an order of removal but for whom the government cannot secure cooperation from the
receiving country).
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agencies increase the use of detention or Congress mandates it, they can expect
litigation. 69
The agencies' particular patterns of detention also contribute to an increase
in litigation. The government has a pattern of relocating non-citizens to large
detention centers, often far from the family and attorneys of the non-citizen. 70
For example, an individual arrested at the airport in New York is sent to detention centers in New Jersey or in York, Pennsylvania. 71 An individual apprehended in Nevada may be interned in Eloy, Arizona. 72 Many of these detained
individuals do not have counsel and the "jail house" lawyers share information
about seeking habeas or petitions for review. Some may file these applications in
69. In June 2003, the ICE Office of Detention and Removal released "Endgame," its ten-year removal strategy, which demonstrates the intent of the agency to increase its efforts to detain and remove aliens who
have received a final order of removal from an IJ. The actual strategy can be found at http://www.ice/
gov/doclib/pi/dro/endgame.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2006). ICE has focused the Endgame in several
ways, the most expansive being Operation: Compliance, a pilot program launched in Hartford, Denver,
Atlanta, and now Miami, where ICE agents are positioned at the back of IJ courtrooms, awaiting the
issuance of removal orders. Once those orders are issued, the agents take the unsuspecting alien into
custody, where he or she remains pending appeal and ultimate removal. See Ricardo Alonso-Zaldivar,
Foreigners Fighting Orders to Leave U.S. May Face jail, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2004, at A28; Alfonso
Chardy, New Program Raises Stakes far Foreign Nationals, MIAMI HERALD, Oct. 9, 2004, at 3B.
70.

See, e.g., Gandarillas-Zambrana v. Board of Immigration Appeals, 44 F.3d 1251, 1256 (4th Cir. 1995)
("there is nothing inherently irregular ... about the ... transfer from Virginia to Louisiana."); Sasso v.
Milhollan, 735 F. Supp. 1045, 1047 n.6 (S.D. F1a. 1990) (describing transfer of thirty-five to forty noncitizen felons three or four times each month from Miami to Oakdale, Louisiana or Laredo, Texas);
Committee of Cent. Am. Refugees v. INS, 682 F. Supp. 1055, 1060 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (describing regular
transfers from San Francisco district to El Centro, California or F1orence, Arizona); Louis v. Nelson, 544
F. Supp. 973, 983-84 n.27 (S.D. F1a. 1982) (describing transfer of hundreds of Haitian refugees from a
detention facility outside of Miami to remote locations across the country, including Fort Allen, Puerto
Rico and Brooklyn, New York, and to the Bureau of Prisons's facilities in places such as Otisville and
Raybrook, New York; Latuna and Big Springs, Texas; Lexington, Kentucky; Morgantown and Alderson,
West Virginia). See generally Arias-Agramonte v. Comm'r of INS, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15716, *27
(S.D.N.Y. Oct. 30, 2000) ("Detained aliens are routinely transferred to facilities in other INS districts,
often a great distance away, under the Attorney General's authority.").

71 . The Legal Aid Society of New York provides a guide for detainees and their families and offers instructions that reflect the great distances over which detainees may be transported:
Some facilities, such as the Global Enforcement Outsourcing facility in Q!leens, New York (formerly known as Wackenhut) or the Elizabeth New Jersey facility, are used exclusively for people
seeking political asylum. Others are just for immigration detainees such as the facilities in Oakdale in Louisiana and Krome in F1orida. Most detainees are held in local jails that are paid a fee
by the government for holding detainees. At this time, there is no facility for holding detainees in
New York City. Detainees from New York are first taken to the immigration detention center at
Varick Street in Manhattan. From Varick Street, detainees are most often sent either to Oakdale,
Louisiana, or the Passaic County Jail in Paterson, New Jersey.
BRIAN LoNEGAN & THE LEGAL Arn Soc'v IMMIGR. L. UNIT, IMMIGRATION DETENTION AND REMOVAL: A GUIDE FOR DETAINEES AND THEIR FAMILIES 3 (2004), http://www.legal-aid.org/Uploads/
IMMIGRATIONDETENTIONREMOVAL.pdf;see also Samuel v. INS, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 801,
at •12 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2005) (describing transfer from various locations in New York State to Pike
County Jail in Pennsylvania and to an INS detention facility in Waterproof, Louisiana).
72. Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2002) (individual detained in Carson City, Nevada and
transported to a detention facility in Eloy, Arizona).
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the hope of also winning a stay of removal and others may simply not know what
the effect of seeking judicial review may be and file because they have a belief
that it means that someone outside the detention center and the immigration
service will hear their cases. 73
Helping to animate the entire field is the growth in the number of attorneys
in the area. There has been a remarkable growth in immigration practice not
only among those attorneys who specialize in the field, but also in the pro bono
and non-profit services available to aid the non-citizens. In 1983, the American
Immigration Lawyers Association ("AILA") had approximately 800 members. 74
In January of 1995, AILA had approximately 3800 members. 75 In 2000, there
were approximately 6300, and in 2005, there were over 9200 members. 76
While there are not enough pro bono attorneys or non-profit organizations
serving the immigrant communities, there has been growth in the area. The New
York Immigration Coalition represents approximately 150 organizations dedicated to immigration law, policy and representation. 77 Studies have shown that
legal representation can actually expedite the administrative process and reduce
litigation. 78 The growth in immigration cases in the federal courts may be attributable to the larger number of attorneys or it may be that a relatively few
number of attorneys are filing a significant number of the cases. 79 This is an

73.

See Attorney Interviews supra note 61.

74.

I joined the organization in 1984 and remember the membership numbers.

75. AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS Ass'N (AILA), 2005 MEMBERSHIP REPORT (on file with AILA and the New
York Law School Law Review).
76.

Id. The numbers may be larger. It is common in law firms to have only one or two members of the firm
pay dues in AILA while the entire firm benefits from this association's resources. Of course, some of these
attorneys only handle business and family immigration cases and in no way participate in the litigation of
removal cases. However, these attorneys refer cases to litigators and refer clients to other sources of support
when they are in removal proceedings.

77. The New York Immigration Coalition, http://www.thenyic.org/content.asp?cid:20 (last visited June 10,
2006).
78.

See ANNA HINKIN, EXEClITIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, EVALUATION OF THE RIGHTS
PRESENTATION, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/statspub/rtspresrpt.pdf (evaluating the "Know Your Rights"
pilot program created by the Florence Immigration Project); see also Bo. OF IMMIGRATION APPEALS,
THE BIA PRO BONO PROJECT IS SUCCESSFUL (2004), http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/reports/BIAProBonoProjectEvaluation.pdf (evaluating the Pro Bono Project, which matches pro se respondents with pro
bono attorneys); Margaret H. Taylor, Promoting Legal Representation for Detained Aliens: Litigation and Administrative Reform, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1647 (1997) (providing a thoughtful assessment of
the value of attorneys in the administrative process).

79.

See Palmer, et al., supra note 19, at 89. The authors find that of that 87% of the petitions for review
pending on the Second Circuit's docket on April 21, 2005 were represented by counsel. Of those petitions,
46% were represented by just 20 law offices, with many of these offices handling over 100 petitions each.
Id.; see also Margaret H. Taylor, Behind the Scenes ef St. Cyr and Zadvydas: Making Policy In the
Midst ef Litigation, 16 GEO. lMMIGR. L.J. 271 (2002).
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area where further study is needed to fully understand the motivation and strategic position of the parties. 80
V.

CONGRESS TRIES TAILORING THE CUTS

The agency is producing more raw product - the paper. The dolls have
multiplied and are animated. The litigants are motivated to fight harder and
longer. Moreover, Congress has passed jurisdictional statutes that fold and multiply the forms of judicial review, albeit inadvertently. While it is true that the
bulk of the court's workload increase is from the new output of cases by the BIA,
some portion is due to appeals from habeas petitions. But the rebirth of habeas led
to an increase in the workload of the federal district courts as well. As I explained previously, people who were expressly prohibited from filing a petition
for review of the administrative order of removal instead sought judicial review
using the writ of habeas corpus. 81 Further, as the statute requires the petition for
review to be filed within thirty days of the order of removal, 82 some non-citizens
sought habeas review because the petition for review would have been dismissed
as untimely. 83 It is not possible to absolutely identify how many immigrationrelated habeas petitions were filed since the 1996 court stripping legislation because the Administrative Office of the United States Courts does not publish
statistics that distinguish between the types of habeas petitions. 84 Nevertheless, it
appears that the total volume of immigration-related habeas petitions was perceived as increasing. Still, the total percentage of all immigration-related matters in the district courts was less than .2% of the total volume of all civil
matters. 85 The government was frustrated by the habeas filings as they were
more difficult to handle administratively through the Office of Immigration Litigation, which is largely based in Washington, D.C., and local district court mat80.

See injTa Part VI.A.2 (discussing the need for further evaluation before conclusions about the sources of
the increase in immigration litigation can be fully developed).

81 .

See supra text accompanying note 13.

82. See INA § 242(b)(l); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(l) (2000).
83. Other articles in this symposium will discuss whether habeas corpus could still be used if a petition for
review were foreclosed. See generally Gerald L. Neuman, On the Adequacy of Direct Review After
the REAL ID Act of 2005, 51 N.Y.L. Sett. L. REv. 133 (2006); Nancy Morawetz, Back to the Future? Lessons Learned from Litigation over the 1996 Restrictions on judicial Review, 51 N.Y.L.
Sett. L. REv. 113 (2006).
84. The Administrative Office does keep statistics identifying original proceedings in the district courtS related
to deportation cases, which I presume to be immigration-related habeas. See MECHAM, supra note 3, at
Table C-2. A former research assistant conducted several telephone interviews with the Administrative
Office between the spring of 2005 and the fall of 2006 during which the Administrative Office indicated
that it could not release more detailed data.
85. MECHAM, supra note 3, at Table C-2. This figure was arrived at by dividing the number of "deportation" actions (316) by the total number if civil actions under statutes (19,017) commenced in district courts
in 2004.
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ters were increasing at the same time as the enormous, explosive increases in the
petitions for review filed in the courts of appeals.
The lack of clear data about immigration-related habeas petitions and
whether there was actually an increase in these filings may have contributed to
the congressional perception that habeas filings were interfering with the orderly
administration of the expulsion of people; it appears that courts granted relief in
a significant number of the habeas cases. Despite procedural hurdles and the
narrow scope of habeas review, one study showed that nearly 17% of the habeas
petitions filed in the Southern District of New York secured some form of procedural or substantive relief for the non-citizen facing removal. B6 While 17% may
not seem like a very large number, these are the cases that at least, in theory,
Congress sought to insulate from judicial review because Congress trusted the
administrative process to be sufficient.
Facing the increased volume of immigration cases, Congress once again
picked up its shears. In May of 2005, Congress took the dramatic step of explicitly barring district courts from habeas corpus review of removal orders.87 On
the surface this cut makes sense, for it appears to answer the Supreme Court
directly in St. Cyr and other cases where the Court says that Congress has not
explicitly indicated its unambiguous intention to preclude habeas.BB At the same
time that Congress removed some forms of habeas, it repealed the express prohibition on judicial review of deportation orders based on certain crimes.B 9 In a
sense, this cut was a restoration of jurisdiction. Further, if the statute is not
found to be a restoration of review, the suspension of habeas may be unconstitu86. Rebecca Rossel, A Call for Reform: The Current State of Habeas Corpus in the Southern District of New
York 10 (May 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Review). This paper
was prepared as part of a year-long empirical assessment of all immigration-related habeas petitions filed
between June 25, 2001 and December 21, 2004 in the Southern District of New York. In another
excellent honors paper, Howard Zakai prepared a pro se habeas manual examining the complex doctrinal
issues presented in immigration habeas. His analysis was completed days before the passage of the REAL
ID Act limitation on immigration habeas. See Howard Zakai, Habeas Corpus: A Manual for Aliens
within the Second Circuit Seeking Review of Final Orders of Deportation (May 2005) (unpublished
paper, on file with the New York Law School Law Review). Both of these papers illuminate some of the
very real problems presented by the administrative adjudications and the complex set of practical hurdles
facing many of the non-citizens such as lack of access to counsel or the harm caused by incompetent counsel.
87. REAL ID Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231, Div. B, Title I, § 106(c) (May 11, 2005). The
REAL ID Act creates INA§ 242(a)(5), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5), making the courts of appeals the exclusive
means of review, excluding habeas challenges to orders of removal. The district courts have recognized
that "all habeas corpus petitions brought by aliens that were pending in the district courts on the date the
REAL ID Act became effective (May 11, 2005) are to be converted to petitions for review and transferred
to the appropriate courts of appeals." Bonhometre v. Gonzales, 414 F.3d 442, 446 (3d Cir. 2005). District courts have now begun the tedious task of transferring cases that have already been partially adjudicated to the court of appeals for new proceedings. For an extensive discussion of the concerns of the district
courts raised by the REAL ID Act, see Enwonwu v. Chertoff, No. 05-10511-WGY, 2005 U.S.Dist.
LEXIS 13890 (D. Mass. July 12, 2005).

88.

See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2003); see also Neuman, supra note 83; Morawetz, supra note 83.

89. This express prohibition was in former INA § 242(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(l) (repealed).
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tional. At least in theory, the petition for review should provide the adequate
and sufficient substitute for the habeas review now precluded. 90 In other words,
Congress recognized that some form of judicial review would continue and chose
to limit that review to the circuit courts of appeals rather than have some litigation continue in the federal district courts. As I explain below, however, these
changes are unlikely to result in a more efficient or limited judicial review of
immigration cases.
VI. ANIMATING JURISDICTION: DESIGN FOR A DYNAMIC REALITY

This paper has established that Congress hoped to reduce the volume and
length of judicial review of immigration removal orders and that the statutory
means it selected were not only unsuccessful but, in combination with the other
factors, the statutory restrictions increased the total volume of cases. Perhaps that
critique is sufficient to convince a few observers or policy-makers that court stripping is not going to reduce the amount of judicial review or even produce compliant paper dolls moving in lock-step down an efficient assembly line. Yet, the
critique does not answer what might be done to achieve the goals of efficient and
certain methods of judicial review that would produce finality in the system
while at the same time ensuring accuracy and fairness. 91
David Martin provided a thoughtful assessment of the administrative process used to assess claims of asylum. 92 At the time he wrote, the asylum system
was growing exponentially and there was significant empirical evidence of political and/or racial bias in the adjudication system. As part of his framing introduction he noted the problem with trying to design legislation or administrative
systems when there is a great deal of variation in the problems and people within
the system, and government seeks to create an overarching process to handle the
problem without recognizing the degree to which variation and complexity
would frustrate the designer's best intentions. He quoted the analyst Walter
Lippmann who noted that in such policy formulations the analysts tried to impose their world view or perceived need and thus formulated a map or solution

90.

See Heikkila v. Barber, 345 U.S. 229, 235 (1953) (limits on judicial review are permitted, provided that
the core of habeas review remains); see also Neuman, supra note 83; Morawetz, supra note 83.

91 . While a just adjudication system must preserve values other than efficiency, the main focus of this paper is
to examine those factors and dynamic interactions that frustrate the actions taken primarily as a means of
achieving efficiency. As will be seen later, some of my reform suggestions touch on ways of reducing the
workload of the removal system by taking some people out of it all together. Obviously another reason for
making these suggestions beyond the goal of efficiency is the promotion of a more just or tailored immigration policy.
92. David Martin, Reforming Asylum Atfjudication: On Navigating the Coast
L. REV. 1247 (1990).
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that included a sketch of the nonexistent "Coast of Bohemia."93 As Martin noted,
the "Coast of Bohemia" problem requires patient study and design of an adjudication system with incentives that deter problems and increase the trust in the
adjudication system.
But even as we attempt that better design, I am haunted by the imagery of
Lippmann - he tells us that policymakers need maps to guide them to the solutions. He worries about the imperfections of the map. But assuming we avoid
creating a map with mythical coastlines, will our system avoid the other limitations of maps - their inherent lack of the experiences of dimension, context and
reality? Map is not territory. 94
We can show members of Congress that the stripping of judicial review in
the courts of appeals for certain classes of non-citizens led to a revival of litigation in the federal district courts. The members see that and read the case decisions and respond, "Okay, strip habeas in the federal district courts and to
forestall a constitutional attack, we'll create a narrow form of review in the
courts of appeals." Congress may have believed they saw the territory and made
the map - the statutory scheme - fit. The administrators of the EOIR show
that the backlog is growing and too many panels are taking too long to issue
individualized decisions and the administrators respond, let's find a "short cut"
for the cases that do not present new issues and streamlined summary affirmances
are born.
If you have ever relied solely on a map to prepare for travel in a new place,
you have learned that maps do not accurately reflect the experience of being in the
place. Maps do not tell you which neighborhoods are clogged with traffic or
whether the residents of a neighborhood welcome strangers. Maps rarely reveal
whether you can travel between one spot and another unless there is some obvious geophysical limitation such as an ocean. It is unfortunate that Congress and
the agency resorts to cutting process and limiting access to review rather than
thinking through the varied forces that shape the caseload and also examining the
interrelationship of those forces. You simply can't solve this problem by conceiving it as a piece of paper that can be folded and cut. While the litigants attacking
the agency decisions may bear some responsibility for using the judicial review
process in cases where delay is the essential goal, the attorneys and self-repre-

93. WALTER LIPPMANN, PuBLIC OPINION 27 (1922), available at http://xroads.virginia.edu/-Hyper2/
CDFinal/Lippman/cover.html. The Bohemia coast makes an appearance in William Shakespeare's A
Winter's Tale, Act III, scene iii.
94. JONATHAN z. SMITH, MAP IS NoTTERR!TORY: STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGION (1978) (quoting
ALFRED KORZYBSKI, SCIENCE AND SANITY 58 (1958)); see also Lenni B. Benson, Breaking Bureaucratic Borders: A Necessary Step Towards Immigration Law Refbrm, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 203 (2002)
(providing a lengthy exploration of this concept and a warning that policy makers should live the experience of the territory before trying to formulate a plan based on a statute or "map" alone).
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sented non-citizens may have had few immediate choices given the lengthy, if not
permanent, barriers to return. 95
Congress and policy analysts need to see the animated people in the process
and reflect on the incentives to seek judicial review. I do not have a detailed map
or topographical plan to set the proper boundaries because the exact nature and
extent of the problems are not yet understood. However, I would urge Congress,
the courts and the agencies to focus on a framework that evaluates the incentives,
the remedies, and the adaptability of the system. In this final section of the article, I suggest some ways to improve the entire adjudication process. Some of the
reforms focus on the quality of the process and others on the substantive issues
that create incentives to fight or litigate. While some of the suggestions below
may appear to be aimed at reforming substantive immigration law, my goal is to
illustrate that the system designers must understand the dynamics of the immigration law. Whether the goal of the system is increased efficiency or prioritizing
thorough case-by-case adjudication, the system design must anticipate how adjudication interacts with the larger immigration context.
A.

Enhance the Process
1.

Recognize the Value
the Process.

ef Thorough

and Fair Acfjudications to

Under current case law, due process may not require review by an Article
III court. 96 Setting aside the possibility of an Article I tribunal, the current path
95. If appeals are frivolous both the BIA and the courts of appeals have the ability to address that problem
directly via existing rules and sanctions. But based on some of the reversal rates found in limited empirical studies, I do not believe that the main source of this problem is people mounting frivolous challenges.
The rate or remand or reversal in the Second Circuit is 20%, and has reached as high as 40% in the
Seventh Circuit. See Immigration Litigation Reduction: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. (2006) (statement of John M. Walker, Jr., Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit); Letter from Richard A. Posner, Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, to Richard ]. Durbin, United States Senator (Mar. 15, 2006) (citing Benslimane v.
Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005) (on file with author)); see, e.g., Rossel, supra note 86, at 10
(finding a 17% rate of remand to the agency in habeas cases).

96. The Supreme Court has never held that the separation of powers doctrine requires some judicial review of
administrative immigration adjudication to be conducted in an independent Article III court. It is beyond
the scope of this article to discuss whether an Article I court might provide an appropriate forum. There
are several excellent articles on discussing the merits of an Article I court. See, e.g., Maurice A. Roberts,
The Board of Immigration Appeals: A Critical Appraisal, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 29 (1977); Maurice
A. Roberts, Proposed: A Special Statutory Immigration Court 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 1 (1980); Robert E. Juceam & Stephen Jacobs, Constitutional and Policy Considerations of an Article I Immigration Court, 18 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 29 (1980); Stephen H. Legomsky, Forum Choices far the Review
of Agency Atfjudication: A Study of the Immigration Process, 71 IowA L. REv. 1297 (1986) (based
on a Administrative Conference of the United States ("ACUS") study identifying value of judicial review
to both agency and those regulated); see also, Ella Goldenberg, A Special Proposal: A Specialized Article
III Immigration Court (Spring 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Law
Review); Holly Higgins, Independent study comparing Article I and Article III specialized courts (Spring
2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Law Review).
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of the EOIR destroys trust in the system. Too many of the decisions reveal an
agency that is non-responsive, prone to error, and lack too many of the basic
hallmarks of fair forum adjudication. 97 The entire EOIR process should be examined with the goal of increasing professionalism and improving the BIA's
ability to adapt to the workload before it.
Critics of the BIA have focused both on the poor quality of the decisions and
also on the people selected to be the decision-makers. Although the Department of
Justice indicated that one of the factors that would be used for evaluating the
quality of Board members would be broad experience in immigration and administrative law, as well as comprehensive knowledge of the field of immigration
laws, 98 the government has instead continued to staff the board with members
with extensive law enforcement and prosecutorial experience rather than a more
varied range of expertise. 99 An ABA study also found that members whose opinions have proved to be too progressive or pro-alien have been removed or have
retired with little explanation. 100
It is no stretch of the imagination to assume that a combination of inexperience in a specialized field like immigration law and an emphasis on prosecution
and law enforcement have been partially to blame for the adverse results of BIA
decision-making. To foster trust in the administrative system, Congress must
first improve the quality of the main decision-making agency. Congress could
either create experience requirements or create an independent board that would
recommend nominations of both IJs and BIA Members to the administration. 101
Certainly, Congress must agree that the BIA does not meet the goals of an efficient removal system when a record number of its decisions are being challenged

9 7. One student study calculated that the BIA was producing a remarkable number of cases after it reduced its
membership from 23 to 11. Goldenberg, supra note 96, at 7 & n.24 ("These eleven members reviewed a
total of 41,907 cases in 2003, or approximately 114 cases per day if the members work 365 days a year or
4.75 cases per hour if they work 24 hours a day." She based these estimates on the workload report
produced by EOIR. The report was once published on the EOIR website (http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir/
statspub/fy03syb.pdf (last visited September 11, 2005)), but is no longer available at that address. Similar data can be found in the EOIR Statistical Yearbook, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/eoirlstatspub/
syb2000.main.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2006).
98. DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, supra note 19, at 11.
99. Id. at 12. This report further informs that in 2001, the EOIR appointed three members to the BIA who
had accumulated a combined six decades of service within the Department of Justice Criminal Division,
but had no prior immigration law experience or background.
100. See id.

l 0 l. Sarah Kroll-Rosenbaum, Immigration Review Agency and Judicial Efficiency Act of 2005: A Legislative
Model for Establishing and Improving a Fair and Efficient Process of Judicial Review of Orders of
Removal, 10-22 (Spring 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the New York Law School Law Review)
(includes text of proposed legislation and a proposal for reform of the BIA).
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in the courts and a high number are remanded either by stipulation or formal
court order. 102
EOIR reforms must go further than trying to put the best adjudicators into
the system. The agency needs better funding and increased support to accomplish
the large adjudication task before it. Putting pressure on the individual IJs to
hear cases too quickly or simply to move a docket along too often results in simply
moving problems onto the BIA and then to the courts. While there will still be
those who seek judicial review of administrative orders, the increased quality of
the orders will gradually help the body of law to develop more clearly and will
allow reviewing courts to avoid remands for clarification of findings.
The courts of appeals have grown increasingly frustrated not only by the
increase in appeals, but with the failure of the BIA to recognize mistakes in IJ
decisions. The result of this frustration has been, in some cases, for the courts to
generate complex jurisdictional questions from simple factual disputes. 103 In a
recent memorandum to IJs within the Department of Justice, Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales echoed the frustration of the courts of appeals. 104 In his memo
the Attorney General criticized the work of many of the Department's IJs as
"intemperate or even abusive" and failing to "produce the quality of work that I
expect from employees of [the Department]."1os
The BIA may need internal institutional reforms to re-train particular IJs
or to provide more support so that an IJ does not have to issue a decision without
time for reflection. In his memorandum, the Attorney General announced that
the Deputy and Associate Attorneys General would conduct a "comprehensive
review" of the immigration courts. It is unclear whether this review will address
the more glaring problems addressed in this article. Administrative rules might
be adopted to require more detailed citation to the hearing record. As the current
procedures are to use tape recordings, rather than typed transcripts, the EOIR
might evaluate whether in some contested cases it is wiser to use standard court
reporter transcription. As technology improves and may one day provide accurate written transcriptions to be produced from audio recordings, the EOIR
should consider adopting these improvements. Today, speech software would allow an IJ to dictate the decisions while a fairly accurate transcription is produced.106 At a minimum, the procedures ought to be modified to require an IJ to
102. See CoMM. ON FEo. COURTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 11-12
(discussing experience in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals and noting a high rate of disposition by
settlement which included agreement to remand).
103. See, e.g., supra note 58 and accompanying text.
104. See Memorandum, supra note 65.
105. Id.
106. "Dragon Naturally Speaking," produced by Nuance Communications, Inc., is an example of voice recognition software. See Nuance Communications Home Page,http://www.nuance.com (last visited June 28,
2006). This software was recently reviewed in the The New York Times. See David Pogue, Like
Having a Secretary in Your PC, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2006, at CL Even without training the program
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review a typed transcription of all decisions for accuracy. The time needed to
produce the transcription would also create time for reflection, allowing the IJ to
test his or her decision for persuasiveness and logical consistency, as well as to
provide an opportunity for correction and augmentation.
A rather simple solution may be to increase the number of law clerks supporting the IJs. Judge Michael Daly Hawkins of the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals said that some courts have one law clerk for every ten judges. 107 This
modest investment in personnel might make a significant difference in identifying gaps and errors in the administrative process.
Even in the small percentage of cases where the BIA does issue a written
opinion, the opinions often contain a lack of substantive legal reasoning. These
appellate administrative decisions are important both for the particular case and
also for the guidance the decisions provide to the individual hearing officers. If
the decisions do not fully develop lines of legal argument and explain the underlying legal rationales, they can undermine efficiency by leaving unintended issues
open for future litigation. In some cases, insufficient legal reasoning may result
in reversal by the courts of appeals or unnecessary splits in the circuit courts that
dispute the rationales underlying the BIA decisions.
The EOIR should also establish internal database systems which allow individual staff attorneys at the BIA and the BIA members themselves to track the
subsequent history of each decision. The same reporting should be given to individual IJs. Taking time to recognize the patterns of reversal and the remands on
recommendation of the government would give the members of the EOIR concrete guidance in improving its performance. 108

2.

Recognize the Value

ef judicial Review

to the Process.

Better review, both at the administrative level and in the federal courts,
enhances the quality of our legal system and aids the agency officials administering the law. 109 The dialogue generated in the review process is one of our legal
system's methods of identifying problems in the law. Through judicial review,
we find the areas where statutory reform is needed, where the system is being

to fit a speaker's diction, the software creates a document that is 98.9% accurate. Recently, Adam Davidson, a correspondent for NPR, reviewed the software. While he seemed to be quite impressed by its
accuracy, he discovered that the software does not work when more than one voice speaks. Morning
Edition: Dictation Software Improves Usability, Accuracy (NPR radio broadcast July 24, 2006),
available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5577523. Therefore, it seems that
until further development, this software is unable to transcribe hearings.
l 07. Pamela A. MacLean, Judges Blast Immigration Rulings: Cases Rushed Through Review Process
Result in Erroneous Asylum Denials, Flood Circuits, NATL L. ]., Oct. 24, 2005, at Sl.

l 08. See supra note 58; see also COMM. ON FED. CouRTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CrTY OF N.Y., supra
note 32.
l 09. See Legomsky, supra note 96.
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resisted by large groups of people and where justice may not be served by archaic
rules or overly restrictive statutory provisions.
The ideal forum for judicial review needs to be further evaluated. 110 Immigration cases perhaps should be shifted back to the federal district courts in order
to spread the workload among a larger number of judges. Appeals beyond the
district court level might be limited to the discretion of the deciding judge. 111
Congress might alternatively authorize special panels within the courts of appeals to hear these cases after development of the administrative record. Another
mechanism might be to allow consolidation of cases by a specialized tribunal to
allow efficient resolution of large problems similar to a class action model.
While some in Congress have suggested a single, specialized Article III court
for handling the review of EOIR decisions, specialized courts present their own
problems and cannot necessarily handle the volume of cases. 112 Whether such a
specialized court would solve the workload issue of the federal courts deserves
greater study; however, as this paper has demonstrated, it is not merely the nature of the federal court that contributes to the amount and quality of judicial
review, but rather it is the interaction of the role of the court with the administrative adjudication process and the motivations of the litigants.
B.

Establish Reasonable Incentives
1.

Incentives to Comply With Immigration Laws.

Under our current statutory scheme, "would-be immigrants" can fall into
legal exiles very easily. The bars are complex and not easy to explain. Some
affect those who are newly arrived, some subject even life-long residents to the
threat of removal. So long as people do not naturalize, they remain subject to the
grounds of deportation. As this paper has mentioned, in some cases even minor
criminal conduct can subject a person to the threat of permanent removal. It is
completely understandable that people who have spent the majority of their lives
in the United States would resist leaving. Using our immigration laws as a
form of civil punishment is a policy that deserves closer scrutiny and evaluation
of the consequences not only for the person removed but for their families in the
United States. 113 While I could describe several of the legal exiles, I have selected
11 0. Stephen Legomsky and David Martin have both written excellent papers evaluating many of these issues.
See Legomsky, supra note 96; Martin, supra note 92. It is unfortunate that ACUS no longer exists for
both of those papers were based on studies requested by ACUS.
111. See Kroll-Rosenbaum, supra note 101; if. 28 U.S.C. § 1292b (providing for permission to appeal an
interlocutory decision).
112. An example of a specialized Article III court is the Federal Court of International Trade. Others might
suggest that an Article I court is sufficient; however, given the importance of the rights at stake, delegation of all removal power to the political branches would raise serious constitutional issues. See sources
cited supra note 96.
11 3. Another crucial bar is the ten-year bar that is triggered if a non-citizen fails to depart after an order of
voluntary departure. There is a split in the circuit courts over whether judicial review tolls the deadline.
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the most common barrier as an illustration
the bars for unlawful presence
created in 1996.
Once an individual has acquired more than 180 days of unlawful presence
in the United States, he or she faces a three-year bar on returning but that bar is
only triggered if he or she departs the United States. This odd incentive to remain in the United States after unlawfully entering or overstaying a lawful
entry only gets worse because the penalty increases to a ten-year bar once someone
has a more than one year of unlawful presence. Frequently people who initially
entered the United States know nothing of these long-term consequences and it is
only after they have established employment or personal relationships that would
traditionally authorize immigration to the United States do they find out they
are trapped in "illegal" status. While Congress initially created these bars in the
1996 legislation to create an incentive for individuals to avoid overstaying and
to punish repeat illegal entry, there is no official notice of these barriers and many
people fall into the trap unwittingly. 114 Moreover, in the past Congress has
authorized at least two short term waivers of the bars where individuals could
acquire sponsorship and pay a substantial fine. This pattern of imposing a tough
absolute limit followed by relaxing the barrier through temporary forgiveness has
only increased the confusion among the immigrant communities and their legal
advisors. The short term waivers were not universally available and resulted in
situations where similarly situated people had dramatically different outcomes. A
person who could find a sponsor before April of 2001 is forgiven illegal entry, a
person who did not or who entered after April finds no forgiveness. These complex waivers, and I have not fully described the complexity of it here, create a
perception among many non-citizens that they can access these exceptions if they
have a clever lawyer or if they simply wait long enough for Congress to act. As
this article goes to press, Congress is once again considering a range of legalization programs that might forgive past violations of status. 115
If Congress would more carefully tailor its use of deportation and consider
more generous exceptions or waivers, it is likely that many of the people now
litigating fiercely would either not be in the removal system or would have the
Compare Ramsay v. INS, 14 F.3d 206 (4th Cir. 1994) (holding that voluntary departure period may be
tolled) with Casteneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576 (10th Cir. 1994) (courts have no authority to extend departure period). See also Chelsea Walsh, Note: Voluntary Departure Stopping the Clock far Judicial
Review, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2857 (2005). The First Circuit recently revisited this issue and overruled
its prior holding that it had the authority to extend the departure period, perhaps signaling a trend away
from tolling. Bocova v. Gonzales, 412 F.3d 257 (1st Cir. 2005). This is an important example of where
an incentive to comply with a final order may not have been sufficiently developed by Congress. See also
American Immigration Law Foundation's Legal Action Center, Practice Advisory: Staying the Voluntary
Departure Period When Filing a Motion to Reopen or Reconsider (Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://
www.ailf.org/lac/lac_pa_121605. pdf.

114. At a minimum, the DHS might consider providing new entrants with a written warning. This warning
might be incorporated in the admission documents issued to most non-citizens entering the United States.
115. See, e.g., Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 2 (2006).
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opportunity for fair treatment at the administrative levels. When we make the
forgiveness boundaries too small, people will litigate about the boundaries of the
net or the box. Of course, the administration could be part of the solution of this
issue immediately. The DHS is notorious, as it was when it was part of the
Department of Justice, for failing to exercise prosecutorial discretion. Rather
than carefully selecting which cases should be in removal proceedings, the agencies
continue to prosecute all cases notwithstanding the fact that Congress has restricted the forms of discretionary relief.
In those cases where discretion is possible, where individual adjudication is
necessary to determining eligibility for forgiveness, it is essential to have an adjudication system that acts with consistency and professionalism. Unfortunately,
the current system does not prioritize the adjudication of even the few existing
waivers after deportation, and the process is lengthy and uncertain. 116 Predicting eligibility for forgiveness is nearly impossible. Perhaps Congress should consider delegating these discretionary decisions to a division of the DHS that
resolves benefits rather than to those who enforce the removal statutes. On the
other hand, restoring greater discretion to the IJs and EOIR may also increase
the quantity of litigation before the agency. A way to avoid increased litigation
would be to reduce the breadth and scope of the grounds of deportability rather
than relying on waivers to alleviate the harshness of the removal statutes. For
example, creating a statute of limitations for long-term residents would generate
broad exemptions from removal grounds, eliminating the need for both litigation
and reliance waivers.
2.

Reduce the Incentive to Fight by Creating Forms
from Removal

of Relief

When an individual is placed in removal proceedings and learns that he or
she has no legal basis to remain in the United States, the obvious incentive is to
evade the entire proceeding and to live underground. This is why so many of the
orders are issued in absentia and one reason why the government has increased
the use of detention to ensure attendance at the removal proceedings. Congress
tried to counterbalance the incentive to avoid the removal hearing by providing
harsh consequences for those who receive an in absentia order. If an individual
possesses the skills and qualities that make him or her eligible for immigration
through our employment system or have the close relatives that qualify the individual for immigration through the family system, does it make sense to subject
him or her to a permanent bar upon departure, or should the bar be one that
could be waived in appropriate equitable circumstances? Alternatively, the bar
116. To prove this assertion is difficult, for there is no transparent published information available about the
government processing waivers. The government websites contain only limited information and most
people would need an attorney to learn about the possibility of a waiver. See infta sources cited in note
123.
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might be reduced to a shorter period of penance or punishment. A ten-year bar is
simply one that creates the wrong incentive. People with strong ties to this country will be unwilling to face that punishment. 117 Further, if the underlying policy is to incentivize immigration law compliance, these bars have not been
successful.
For those individuals who are subject to a final order not obtained in an in
absentia proceeding, statutes similarly bar them from reentry for at least ten
years and that bar increases to twenty years {or those who have been removed at
least once before.11 8 For those people removed due to a conviction for an aggravated felony, the bar is permanent. 119 If the individual has the ability to use the
legal immigration system to reenter the United States after removal through a
non-immigrant or immigrant visa, the statutes authorize a very limited
waiver; 120 it is available only to those who obtain the consent of the Attorney
General to the person's readmission. 121 This waiver is actually adjudicated by a
special unit of the DHS. 122 An individual who wants to obtain this waiver
must wait abroad for this exercise of discretion. For some, the risk that the
waiver will be denied must be weighed against the incentive to prolong their
presence in the United States. One possible way to increase compliance with
removal orders is to limit the waiver to those who comply within a certain time
period of the finality of the order of removal. Another approach might be to
make the results in past waiver applications more transparent. At the current
time, the decisions on the waivers are rarely reported. The major treatise in the
field only reports on a handful of such cases. 123 In the past, the agency has also
117. See Singh v. INS, 295 F.3d 1037, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing the reasons someone would not
appear and pointing out that the petitioner should not be seen as someone merely absconding); see also
Lory Diana Rosenberg, Gonna Need Somebody on Your Bond: Pre-Removal Detention Under the
INA, 8 BENDER'S IMMIGR. BULL. 1409 (2003).
11 8. INA§ 212(a)(9)(A)(ii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(ii).
119. Id.
120. This waiver is called the 1-212 waiver after the form used to make the application.
121. INA § 212(a)(9)(A)(iii), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(A)(iii).
1 2 2. The implementing regulations for this provision delegate the authority to adjudicate these waivers to
"[o]fficers in charge of overseas offices." 8 C.F.R. § 207.3(a) (2006).
123. See CHARLES GORDON, STANLEY MAILMAN, & STEPHEN YALE-LOEHR, 5-63 IMMIGR. LAW& PROCEDURE § 63.10(4)(b) n.115. Interestingly this footnote reports only decisions where the waiver was
granted. While the CIS now publishes some of the appeals of the denial of the permission to reapply, I
reviewed the five posted decisions for the year 2004 and all of the cases concerned appeals that sustained
the denial of the waiver. I then reviewed several years' worth of posted decisions and found only one
remand. I recently came across one unpublished, redacted opinion from December 5, 2005, where an
appeal was sustained and an application to reapply was granted. There, an IJ had failed to take into
account a Fifth Circuit finding that a DWI conviction failed to serve as an aggravated felony. The IJ had
relied solely on the conviction and failed to weigh the applicant's seventeen-year marriage to a U.S.
citizen and his eleven-year legal residency in the United States without so much as a speeding ticket. It is
unclear why the librarians who are responsible for the postings did not post any cases where the decision to
deny a waiver was reversed but the absence of reversals suggests that it is difficult for members of the
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used a preapproval mechanism to allow certain people to depart with the approved waiver already issued. 124
I must acknowledge that forms of relief also create incentives to litigate.
The statistical analysis prepared by John Palmer, Elizabeth Cronin and Stephen
Yale-Loehr indicates that a very significant percentage of the cases currently
pending in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals are petitions seeking review of a
denial of asylum. 125 This evidence at first blush appears to suggest that the
availability of this relief leads to litigation, and that if there was not such relief
available, these cases would not be in court. It is hard to generalize about which
forms of relief will mitigate or increase litigation workloads. Providing reasonable and realistic opportunities for a person who has been found deportable to
legally immigrate in the future will create an incentive for that person to "step in
line" with the administrative procedures and stop litigating about the
boundaries.
3.

Understand ]udt"cial Stays
Removal

of Removal and the Effect of

It is not uncommon for opponents of judicial review to argue that noncitizens only seek judicial review of an order of removal in an effort to delay or
frustrate execution of the order. Congress addressed this concern in the 1996
legislative reforms when it removed the automatic stay provisions that accompanied petitions for review and shortened the time period for seeking review from
six months to thirty days. 126 Previously, the statute had created an automatic
stay of removal upon the filing of a petition for review and further, the statute
expressly stated that removal would cancel jurisdiction. 127 Today, filing a petition for review does not automatically generate a stay of removal. A review of
public or the bar to know what criteria the agency seeks before granting such a waiver. For administrative decisions see Decisions Issued in 2005 - Code H4, http://www.uscis.gov/graphics/lawsregs/admindec3/h4/2005/index.htm (last visited Aug. 10, 2006).
124. See Gordon, Mailman, Yale-Loehr, supra note 123, at § 74.03 (discussing the defunct process of advanced arrangements for immigrant visas by aliens present in the United States).
12 5. Palmer, et al., supra note 19.
126. INA § 242(b)(l), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(B)(l) (2000). The statute does not expressly state that jurisdiction
continues after removal but that is the implicit result based on the repeal of the prior statutory provision
that terminated jurisdiction. A number of courts have addressed this specific issue. See, e.g., Rife v.
Ashcroft, 374 F.3d 606, 615 (8th Cir. 2004) (explaining that "an alien's removal does not moot his or her
petition for judicial review"); U.S. v. Garcia-Echavarria, 374 F.3d 440, 447 (6th Cir. 2004) (explaining
that "an alien's removal while his petition for review is pending neither deprives the court of appeals of
jurisdiction over that petition nor does it necessarily render moot the claims in that petition").
127. INA§ 106(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a)(3) (1994) (repealed by Omnibus Consolidated Appropriations Act
of 1997, Pub. L. No. 104-208, Div. C, Title III, § 306(b), 110 Stat. 3009-612 (1996)). There were a
few exceptions to the rule that removal ended the court's jurisdiction. For example, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals had ruled that the government must bring respondents back to the United States if their
removal was in violation of a stay order or achieved in a manner that denied the respondent an opportunity to appeal. Mendez v. INS, 563 F.2d 956, 958 (9th Cir. 1977).
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the practice in the circuits indicates that by and large the courts of appeals do
grant stays when the petitioner makes a proper showing. 128 If it is true that a
stay of removal is a primary incentive to seek review, Congress and the courts
could address the issue of the stay more directly. For example, the courts might
require that the application for a stay clearly articulate the legal errors and an
argument of why the respondent is likely to prevail. Some blanket lines might be
drawn, such as stays would be available only to those people who are contesting
removability itself or have sought a form of relief other than voluntary
departure.
Currently, the BIA regulations use the opposite approach. Once the individual has departed the country or has been removed by the government, the BIA
holds that its jurisdiction ends. Those respondents who wish to file a motion to
reopen because new relief has become available or a motion to reconsider based on
a change in the law must seek judicial review in an effort to preserve their
ability to pursue these administrative remedies. In general, these motions are to
be filed within ninety days of the final order. 129 A change in the BIA regulations
allowing motions to reopen and reconsider to be heard within a reasonable period
of time after removal would decrease the incentive to seek judicial review solely
as a method of delaying removal. The appeal of the motion to reopen/reconsider
could be combined with the appeal of the underlying order of removal. 130
128. In a study of the practice in the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the government took the position that no
removal order would be processed when the petition for review was pending. This step was apparently
taken to reduce the burden on the government attorneys handling the stay requests. While this is an
understandable position of the government, it does of course create an incentive by the litigants to file a
petition for review knowing that it will in essence produce the effect of a formal stay. See CoMM. ON
FED. CouRTS, Ass'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., supra note 32, at 11.
129. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23. There are a few necessary exceptions to this time limit such as setting aside an in
absentia order where the respondent did not receive notice of the removal proceeding. There is no time
limit where the person did not receive notice as that would create a due process violation. See Andia v.
Ashcroft, 359 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2004). There is also an exception to the strict time limit if the government joins in the motion. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(iv). The period is extended to 180 days where the
respondent can establish exceptional circumstances. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.23(b)(4)(ii). There is no systematic
reporting of when the government will join in a joint motion to reopen but the anecdotal evidence based on interviews with trial attorneys and reading postings on attorney list-servs discussing the criteria
judges use to grant such motions - is that the government attorneys will sometimes join these motions
where an individual has become eligible for legal immigration, usually because of marriage to a U.S.
citizen, and is not otherwise removable as a person convicted of a crime.
1 30. The current statute ineffectually suggests that appeals from motions to reopen/reconsider should be com-

bined with the underlying review of the final order of removal but in reality the timing required to
complete administrative review of the motion to reopen or reconsider does not allow for combining judicial
review of both aspects of the case. See INA§ 242(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d). While the current regulations
require a motion to reopen within 180 days of the final order, the government should consider extending
this period to one year or more given the costs and disruptions of removal and the increased complexity of
preparing such a request from abroad. Moreover, any time limit should have exceptions where the respondent can demonstrate country conditions that frustrated or prevented the application. See Stone v.
INS, 514 U.S. 386, 394 (1995) (holding that filing a motion to reopen or reconsider does not toll original
time period to seek petition for review); Patel v. Ashcroft, 123 F. App'x 72, 74 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining
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Another question that arises as a result of actual removal is what is the
remedy if the respondent actually prevails in his or her appeal? Does the U.S.
government bear the costs of returning the individual to the U.S.? There are no
statutory or regulatory provisions addressing this issue. Certainly attorneys
counseling clients about the consequences of removal cannot promise their clients
that the government will issue documents necessary for their return. If our goal
is to create incentives to comply with removal orders, we need to address this
great area of uncertainty and give statutory rights and methods of enforcement
where the government has erroneously removed an individual. The government
is also notoriously slow in issuing a variety of travel documents. 131 Ideally, the
statute would specify a period when the government must issue these documents
and provide authority to the Department of State to issue a travel document if
the Department of Homeland Security has failed to act within the deadline.

C.

Study the Dynamics in the System

I have argued that the workload of the federal courts is not directly in the
control of Congress or of any single participant in the adjudication system. Still,
Congress and the federal courts are undoubtedly motivated to do something about
a category of cases that are coming to dominate the federal docket. Congress cannot really begin to address the issues until it acquires more information. Congress
and the agencies both should recruit excellent "cartographers" and "ethnologists."
We need people to study the context of the problems and to reflect on the incentives of varied participants. For example, the Office of Immigration Litigation
("OIL") is a very skilled group of attorneys within the Civil Division of the
Department of Justice ("DO]") responsible for the primary defense of the BIA in
federal court. While these attorneys have a wealth of information about the types
of cases being litigated and the decisions of the BIA, they may not be open minded
to a proposal that opposes centralization of judicial review. 132 Based in Washington, D.C., OIL may view the most efficient solution as a single federal court
situated in the District of Columbia. Attorneys representing the non-citizens in
proceedings may prefer the existing standards for the issuance of stays of removal
rather than a system which enforces final orders more rapidly but preserves judicial review. The goals and values of the EOIR and the agency enforcing the
removal orders also need to be carefully evaluated before accepting assertions that
that while the court can hear a petition for review denying a motion to reopen or reconsider an in
absentia order, the court cannot consider any challenge to the underlying order.)
131 . Statement of Paul K. Martin, Deputy Inspector General, U.S. Department of Justice. Committee on
House Judiciary, Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims (Mar. 10, 2005).
132. There is also a special civil division located within the U.S. Attorneys Office for the Southern District of
New York. To my knowledge this is the only office outside ofWashington D.C that has a group dedicated
to immigration litigation. As of May 2006, OIL was asserting main responsibility for these cases. The
workload of OIL has grown so rapidly that Assistant U.S. Attorneys all over the country have been
assigned to immigration appeals. Interview with Patricia Buchanan, AUSA, S.D.N.Y. (April 2006).
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existing procedures are sufficient or adequately protect individualized decisionmaking.
There are many serious empirical questions. Does the bifurcated agency divided between DHS and DOJ contribute to the administrative efficiencies? In
what way? ICE Attorneys are separate from the DOJ and housed within the
DHS. Is this the most efficient structure? If the DOJ attorneys in OIL ultimately must defend the administration in the federal courts, are the lessons
learned in the litigation communicated through the channels of OIL to the attorneys within ICE? To develop the proper culture of prosecutorial discretion, coordination of prosecutorial priorities is essential.
In what way is the behavior of the immigration bar driving the increase in
the workload? Are too many appeals frivolous? Do the current statutory
prohibitions on frivolous appeals mean that the agency and the courts are reluctant to ever label an appeal frivolous because the sanction to the non-citizen is a
permanent bar on relief under the immigration laws? 133 In conducting my research for this article I learned that at least one attorney has been sanctioned for
his failure to file briefs and for failure to adequately prepare the appellate
briefs. 134 While it is time-consuming for the circuit courts of appeal to bring such
sanctions, it does seem like the wiser approach to deter the behavior of attorneys
who may be inadequately representing the non-citizens or may be inappropriately filing petitions for review that have no reasonable basis in law. Certainly,
the approach of sanctioning attorneys who abuse this system is preferable to blanket rules that try to constrain advocacy for an entire class of cases or that sanction
the non-citizen asylum applicant who may not even be aware of the nature of his
or her counsel's behavior.
Similarly, the courts might more frequently consider an award of fees under
the Equal Access to Justice Act. This Act authorizes attorney's fees where the
government's position was not reasonably supported and the petitioner
prevailed. 135
While Congress might assign some of the study to the Government Accountability Office or convene a select committee or an independent commission, there
are other institutional actors who can assist in evaluating these issues. For example, the Federal Judicial Center's Research Division provides studies on the
trends in federal judicial case management as well as training and education for

l 3 3. If the agency or court finds a claim frivolous it can bar the non-citizen from all future relief under the
immigration laws. INA§ 208(d)(6) renders a noncitizen who "has knowingly made a frivolous application for asylum," and who has received proper notice, "permanently ineligible for any benefits" under the
INA. INA § 208(d)(6), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(d)(6).
l 34. After a hearing, the Second Circuit assigned a Special Master to monitor the conduct of the attorney. See
Court of Appeals Docket No. 03-4640 (2d Cir. 2005).
135. See supra note 64 (discussing Equal Access to Justice Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2412).
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attorneys in complex practices. 136 The ABA commissioned study conducted by
Dorsey & Whitney, LLP demonstrates the type of study that can be completed on
complex issues of immigration law. 137 Private research institutions reflecting a
range of political opinions such as the Migration Policy Institute, the Brookings
and Cato Institutes, the RAND Corporation, the Institute for Policy Studies,
Center for Migration Studies, the American Immigration Lawyers Foundation's
Immigration Policy Center and the National Center for Policy Analysis, conduct
independent studies that focus on many of these issues. The issues are too great
and too complex to be allowed to legislate in a vacuum. 138
VII.

CONCLUSION

This article has suggested that the empirical reality of the congressional attempts to reduce federal court review of administrative immigration orders combined with the judicial and administrative response to congressional pressure
have perversely increased the amount and complexity of judicial review. The
real goal of this essay is not to prove an empirical assertion but rather to capture
the dynamic of our governmental adjudication of immigration cases.
Immigration cases are fundamentally about people. Law can attempt to
control and limit the behavior of people but where those laws are disconnected
from the reality of people's lives or where the law devalues the ties people have in
the United States, any attempt to "control" people via the mechanism of immigration law is frankly, a doomed mission. People are not paper, easily manipulated, folded and reduced for convenience.
If Congress truly wants to achieve an efficient and cost effective mechanism
to decide who remains and who should be removed, it must first acknowledge
that summary solutions, sweeping categories and blanket denials will not achieve
their goal. Reforms that acknowledge this and create incentives for individual
non-citizens and their counsel to cooperate will help reduce the workload of the
adjudication system. Reforms that people recognize as comporting with fairness
will help courts and the agencies enforce against those who have neither insufficient equities nor serious legal claims.
The hard work for the legislative branch should be the designing of a system
of incentives and tailored justice - justice that is designed to ensure individual
treatment rather than a system which is so rigid that inequities abound. Admit136. For a list of some of the current studies maintained by the Federal Judicial Center see http://www.fjc.gov/
library/fjc_catalog.nsf. Shortly before this article went to press, the Senate passed S. 2611, which, in
§ 707, requires the Comptroller General of the GAO to study the appellate process for immigration appeals. The bill requires that the Comptroller General consider consolidating all BIA appeals and habeas
corpus petitions in immigration cases into one U.S. Court of Appeals. Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act, S. 2611, 109th Cong. § 707 (2006).
137. See DORSEY & WHITNEY, LLP, supra note 19.
138. See Lenni B. Benson, You Can't Get There From Here, U. Cm. LEGAL F. (forthcoming Oct. 2007).
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tedly, Congress usually focuses on the goal of immigration enforcement. Our system of government should be responsive enough to the concerns of sophisticated
interested parties to be able to fashion a system that will respond to these concerns, yet remain flexible enough to respond to the changes necessitated by manipulation or government inefficiency. The immigration adjudication system must
have the ability to respond to varied levels of agency enforcement, respond to
patterns in international affairs, and acknowledge the differences in the claims of
those only recently arrived and those who have spent most of their lives in the
United States. The system should construct a mechanism for adapting to patterns
of abuse and allow for government mechanisms to fairly respond to those abusers.
Congress should spend its energy on this goal rather than spend millions on litigating the illusion of a solution through court stripping. If only the agencies
would stop treating the people in the system as just so much paper to move forward. Put down your shears and paper. Recognize the humans in the "aliens" they are not and cannot be merely paper dolls.
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